

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

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USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4658

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A. STATE 195393 B. USNATO 4622 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY. AT OCTOBER 1 AND 2 SENIOR POLADS MEETINGS, ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES DEEPENED. OVER OBJECTIONS OF U.S. AND OTHERS, FRG PROPOSED THAT THESE MEASURES NOT RPT NOT BE CONFINED TO NATO GUIDELINES AREA AND THAT THE U.S. PROPOSED MEASURE CALLING FOR "LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA" BE DELETED ENTIRELY FROM NATO PAPER ON MBFR. UK REITERATED LONDON'S CONCERN THAT EUROPEAN ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THESE MEASURES WOULD ENABLE SOVIETS TO INTERFERE IN FUTURE
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EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTSM U.S. FLOATED IDEA OF AGREEING NOW THAT ALLIES WOULD PUT FORWARD THE FOUR PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES AS APPLICABLE ONLY TO U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES WHILE GIVING URGENT STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO QUESTION OF PARTICI-

PATION OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES. UK COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THIS APPROACH BUT BELGIUM JOINED CANADA, FRG, AND ITALY IN OPPOSING IT. THEY REMAIN CONCERNED THAT FOCUS ON U. S. AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD TURN MBFR INTO A SOLELY BILATERAL NEGOTIATION. END SUMMARY

1. SENIOR POLADS DISCUSSED PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES ON OCTOBER 1 AND 2. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION FOLLOWS BELOW. SEE SEPTTEL FOR REPORT OF SPC EXCHANGES ON OTHER POINTS.

2. UK UK REP (LOGAN) REVIEWED BASIC BRITISH POSITION ON PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES, WHICH HE SAID HAVE CAUSED A GOOD DEAL OF WORRY AND CONCERN IN LONDON. LONDON HAS STUDIED CAREFULLY THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSING SUCH MEASURES IN MBFR, AND REMAINS CONVINCED THAT SUCH MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II AND WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO INTERFERE IN FUTURE WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS. IF THE ALLIES WHO FAVOR THESE MEASURES ARE CONVINCED THAT THESE DANGERS CAN BE AVOIDED, THE UK WILL LISTEN TO THEIR ARGUMENTS ATTENTIVELY. IT IS CLEAR THESE MEASURES MUST BE STUDIED FURTHER.

3. LONDON IS OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE U. S. HAS CARRIED OUT THE NECESSARY STUDIES ON THE FIRST MEASURE (PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS), AND WILL NOT OBJECT IF THE U.S. WISHES TO PUT FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL IN NEGOTIATIONS. WITH FIRM ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S. THAT WASHINGTON WAS EQUALLY SATISFIED WITH ITS STUDIES ON THE REMAINING THREE MEASURES, LONDON MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THEIR BEING PUT FORWARD, AS MEASURES APPLICABLE TO U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY. THE QUESTION OF THEIR APPLICATION TO NON-U.S. NATO FORCES, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED URGENTLY. IN RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT THAT UK WAS PURSUING AN INCONSISTENT POLICY IN ADVOCATING SUCH MEASURES IN CSCE BUT OBJECTING TO THEM IN MBFR, LOGAN SAID THAT MORE OBLIGATORY CHARACTER OF MBFR MEASURES SETS THEM APART AND LONDON WOULD WISH TO ESTABLISH VERY CLEARLY WITH THE SOVIETS THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO CONNECTION BETWEEN MBFR MEASURES AND CMBS.

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4. BELGIUM. WILLOT WAS THE ONLY EUROPEAN ALLIED REP WHO DIS-AGREED WITH UK ASSERTION THAT LAST THREE MEASURES WOULD ENABLE SOVIETS TO INTERFERE IN WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE AFFAIRS. IN OCT 1. DISCUSSION, HE NOTED THAT IN PARAGRAPH ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS THERE WAS A SPECIFIC STATEMENT THAT "SUCH CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES". ON OCT 2, HOWEVER WILLOT REVERSED HIS POSITION AND JOINED CANADA, FRG, NETHERLANDS AND ITALY IN OPPOSING ANY SEPARATION OF U.S. AND NON-U.S. NATO FORCES FOR LAST THREE MEASURES. CANADIAN AND DUTCH REPS ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NO PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES THAN TO HAVE SEPARATE MEASURES FOR U.S. AND NON-U.S. NATO FORCES. (COMMENT: DUTCH REP TOLD US

AFTER MEETING THAT HE WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF OVER-COMING ALLIED DIFFERENCES ON PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES. END COMMENT) FOLLOWING WILLOT'S COMMENTS, SPC CHAIRMAN KASTL SUGGESTED THAT A LINE BE INSERTED BETWEEN THE FIRST MEASURE AND THE LAST THREE MEASURES STATING THAT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER.

5. U.S. U.S. REP EXPRESSED REGRET AT UK RESERVATIONS TOWARDS THEIR MEASURES. HE KNEW THAT WASHINGTON HAD STUDIED THEM CAREFULLY AND WOULD NOT HAVE PROPOSED INCLUSION OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES IF THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD RESULT IN ANY REDUCTION OF THE SECURITY OF ITS ALLIES. (COMMENT: REASSURANCES ON THIS POINT CONTAINED IN REF A ENABLED US TO STRENGTHEN THIS POINT ON OCT 2. END COMMENT) WHILE THE U.S. WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO HAVE OTHER ALLIES PARTICIPATE IN THESE MEASURES, U.S. REP SAID HE MIGHT AGREE AD REFERENDUM TO AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALLIES TO PUT FORWARD ALL FOUR MEASURES AS APPLYING TO U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, WHILE GIVING URGENT STUDY TO QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION BY NON-U.S. NATO FORCES. U.S. REP BELIEVED THAT KASTL'S PROPOSAL FOR POSTPONING LAST THREE MEASURES FOR FURTHER STUDY, EVEN AS APPLYING TO U. S. AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, WOULD BE TOO RESTRICTIVE.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3310

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6. ITALY ITALIAN REP (SPINELLI) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE U.S. PHRASE "TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE" IN THE SENTENCE READING "THESE CONSTRAINTS WOULD OF NECESSITY BE APPLIED

TO SPECIFIC FORCES IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC TERRITORIES; THEIR FORMULATION SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE FOCUSSED ON FORCES RATHER THAN ON TERRITORIES TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE." ROME RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE BUT WANTED IT FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AS AN OBJECTIVE WHICH LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE IN ALLIED BASIC POSITION, ALLIANCE WOULD AGREE TO SEEK. U.S. REP RESPONDED THAT WHILE WE SUPPORTED THIS PRINCIPLE, WE REMAINED UNCLEAR AS TO HOW THIS COULD BE APPLIED IN PRACTICE AND HOW IT COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED, AND THUS BELIEVED A PHRASE SUCH AS "TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE" WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE. SPINELLI REPEATED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY DILUTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE, AND HE PLACED THIS PHRASE IN BRACKETS.

7. FRG. DESPITE PRIVATE OBJECTIONS OF U.S. AND OTHERS (USNATO SECRET

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4622), FRG REP (RANTZAU) ON OCT. 1 INTRODUCED AMENDMENTS TO TEXT ON PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES WHICH WOULD PERMIT APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES OUTSIDE THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. SPECIFICALLY, HE WOULD AMEND THE PHRASE "MEASURES APPLICABLE IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA" TO READ "MEASURES RELATED TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA". HE ALSO SUGGESTED ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AFTER THE LIST OF MEASURES: " THE MEASURES IN SUBPARAGRAPHS (II) AND (IV) ABOVE WILL FOCUS ON ACTIVITIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING THESE MEASURES TO FORCES IN SPECIFIED TERRITORIES OUTSIDE OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA IS, HOWEVER, NOT EXCLUDED." RANTZAU ALSO STATED THAT FRG IS OPPOSED ENTIRELY TO MEASURE LISTED IN SUBPARA (III). IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, RANTZAU EXPLAINED THAT BONN WISHES TO TAKE EVERY STEP TO AVOID CREATION OF A STRICTLY DEFINED AREA AND WANTS TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING THESE MEASURES IN OTHER AREAS.

8. ITALIAN REP FAVORED GERMAN AMENDMENTS, WHICH CONFORMED WITH ITALIAN DESIRE TO EMPHASIZE FORCES RATHER THAN TERRITORIES. NORWEGIAN REP ALSO REACTED FAVORABLE. U.S., TURKISH, AND DUTCH REPS REGRETTED THIS LAST-MINUTE INTRODUCTION OF MAJOR CHANGE IN FRG POSITION. U.S. REP ALSO DREW ON ARGUMENTS IN REF A IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ON OCT 2. WITH VARIOUS REVISIONS, INCLUDING FRG SUGGESTIONS, NEW PARAGRAPH ON PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES READS AS FOLLOWS:

"23. PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES (RELATED TO) (APPLICABLE IN) THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AIM AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY. SUCH CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THESE CONSTRAINTS WOULD OF NECESSITY BE APPLIED TO SPECIFIC FORCES IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC TERRITORIES; THEIR FORMULATION SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE FOCUSSED ON FORCES RATHER THAN ON TERRITORIES (TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE (1)). SUBJECT TO FURTHER URGENT EXAMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE (2) AND TO THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 14

OF THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT
PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(I) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES
INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

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(II) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE
AREA;

((III) LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR
EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;)

(IV) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN
THE AREA.

(THE MEASURES IN SUBPARAGRAPHS (II) AND (IV) ABOVE WILL FOCUS
ON ACTIVITIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THE POSSIBILITY OF
APPLYING THESE MEASURES TO FORCES IN SPECIFIED TERRITORIES OUT-
SIDE OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA IS, HOWEVER, NOT EXCLUDED.)

FOOTNOTE: (1) THESE CONSIDERATIONS APPLY EQUALLY TO PARAGRAPH 29.

FOOTNOTE (2) THIS EXAMINATION SHOULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF
PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM THE APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES
TO NATO FORCES OTHER THAN U.S. FORCES."

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